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Is it possible to escape? Local protectionism and outward foreign direct 
investment by Chinese privately-owned enterprises 
 
Abstract 
This study explores the impact of local protectionism on outward foreign direct investment 
(OFDI) and how firms respond to local protectionism in a transition economy. We find that 
local protectionism exerts a negative effect on the OFDI decisions of Chinese privately-owned 
enterprises (POEs). However, this negative impact is weakened by POEs’ corporate 
philanthropy strategy, whereas corporate political activity reinforces such an impact. This 
research extends the lens of institutional escapism by highlighting local protectionism as a 
barrier to OFDI and provides new insights into how firms respond to the subnational 
environment by adopting various nonmarket strategies.  
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A substantial increase in outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) from emerging economies 
(EEs) has drawn considerable attention from both academics and policy makers. The literature 
has recognized that OFDI by EE firms is driven by a variety of factors including firm 
characteristics, industry conditions and institutional forces (Li, Cui, & Lu, 2017; Liu, Gao, Lu, 
& Liuliou, 2016; Lu, Liu, & Wang, 2011; Luo & Tung, 2007; 2017; Meyer & Peng, 2016; Xie, 
Huang, Stevens, & Lebedev, 2019). While some studies have revealed the importance of home-
country government support for firms’ OFDI decisions (Arregle, Miller, Hitt & Beamish, 2016; 
Buckley, Clegg, Voss, Cross, Liu, & Zheng, 2018; Gaur, Ma, & Ding, 2018; Lu, Liu, Wright 
& Filatotchev, 2014; Wan & Hoskisson, 2003), others have found that some EE firms’ OFDI 
is motivated by the desire to escape from an unfavorable domestic environment (Cui & Xu, 
2019; Gaur, Kumar, & Singh, 2014; Huang, Xie, Li, & Reddy, 2016; Luo & Tung, 2017; Ma, 
Ding & Yuan, 2016; Shi, Sun, Yan, & Zhu, 2017). This type of escape OFDI is driven by 
political instability, policy uncertainty and an over-regulated domestic market (Barnard & Luiz, 
2018; Stal & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2011), as well as ownership discrimination (Cuervo-Cazurra, 
Luo, Ramamurti, & Ang, 2018; Wu & Chen, 2014).  
The extant literature assumes that firms have the freedom to escape from the home country 
successfully, without considering the institutional constraints imposed by the government 
directly and implicitly (Witt & Lewin, 2007). In particular, this line of inquiry has overlooked 
the interdependence between firms and subnational governments in transition economies, 
where firms and governments are intertwined, and subnational government intervention makes 
escape difficult. This missing aspect is highly relevant to privately-owned enterprises (POEs) 
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and largely limits our understanding of the heterogeneous role of subnational governments in 
firm internationalization. According to the institutional escaping view, POEs have a tendency 
to escape from an unfavorable environment through OFDI (Witt & Lewin, 2007). However, 
POEs’ OFDI only accounts for a small proportion of China’s total OFDI, namely 2.9% in 2012 
and 6.9% in 2017, respectively. This suggests that POEs may encounter some institutional 
barriers to undertaking escape OFDI. 
Relatedly, local protectionism is a widely adopted administrative instrument by subnational 
governments in transition economies, which can affect local firms’ activities and strategies by 
controlling local resources (Young, 2000). Such political logic may intensify the dependence 
of these firms on local resources provided by the government, which reduces POEs’ bargaining 
power and locks them in the focal region. However, few studies have examined the impact of 
local protectionism on OFDI by POEs. This omission largely constrains our understanding of 
the complexity of the subnational environment and the unique ways in which 
subnationalgovernments intervene in OFDI decisions.  
Moreover, while extent research has argued that a nonmarket strategy is an effective 
approach affecting firms’ internationalization (Ma et al., 2016; Meyer, et al., 2014), much 
research in this area has focused on the role of nonmarket strategies in host countries (Marano 
et al., 2016), including MNEs’ corporate social responsibility (CSR) in emerging markets 
(Ertuna & Tukel, 2010), foreign-country entry modes (Meyer et al., 2014), CSR in export 
markets (Costa, Lages, & Hortinha, 2015), international diversification (Strike, Gao, & Bansal, 
2006), subsidiaries’ political strategies (Hillman, Keim, & Schuler, 2004) and corruption 
activities (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2016). However, little is known about the role of nonmarket 
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strategies, such as corporate political activity (CPA) and corporate philanthropy, in POEs’ 
international decisions. In particular, there is a lack of research on how nonmarket strategies 
affect the relationship between the subnational government’s intervention and firms’ OFDI 
decisions. 
To address the gaps identified above, we examine the following research questions in 
resource dependence logic (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). To what extent would local 
protectionism instrumented by the subnational government impede POEs’ OFDI decisions? 
Will CPA strategy and corporate philanthropy strategy moderate the relationship between the 
subnational governments and POEs’ OFDI decisions?   
This study contributes to the literature on OFDI from transition economy firms in several 
ways. First, we enrich the institutional escaping lens by taking account of the interdependency 
between subnational governments and POEs. Subnational governments can set obstacles to 
POEs’ escape OFDI rather than accommodating such investment behaviors. Underpinned by 
resource dependence theory (RDT), we identify the mechanism through which subnational 
governments intervene in firms’ decisions. Our findings complement the existing literature by 
capturing the tension between the control exerted by the subnational government and POEs’ 
tendency to escape, thus moving beyond the focus on the antecedents of firms’ escaping 
behaviors (Witt & Lewin, 2007).  
Second, this research deepens our understanding of environmental characteristics in 
transition economies by bringing in the concept of local protectionism to examine escape OFDI. 
Local protectionism reflects the essential role of a subnational government and represents a 
unique dimension of subnational government intervention in firm decisions. Examining its 
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impact enables us to go beyond existing research on the role of the home-country institutional 
environment by more directly capturing political environmental heterogeneity across regions.  
 Finally, the study extends the literature on nonmarket strategy to the OFDI decisions of 
POEs. The extant literature has overlooked the effect of CPA and corporate philanthropy on 
firms’ decision making in the context of local protectionism (Jia & Mayer, 2015). We identify 
two types of nonmarket strategies as a means of altering the interdependence between POEs 
and the subnational government, and thus provide new insights into the boundary conditions 
for escape OFDI. 
  
Research context: local protectionism in subnational China and POEs’ OFDI 
China, as a transition economy, has experienced continued economic reform and political 
decentralization. National laws and policies are often proposed by the central government, 
while the implementation is delegated to the regional administrations (Peng, 2002; Holtbrugge 
& Berg, 2004). However, the decentralized system can cause inevitable political tournaments 
and rent-seeking behaviors among officials in different provinces (Young, 2000). The central 
government evaluates subnational governments primarily according to the regional GDP-
enhancing index, and thus subnational officials have a greater incentive to boost the regional 
economy in general, and promote the growth of local firms in particular (Bai et al., 2004). 
Local officials can win in the political tournament, and have the opportunity to be promoted, 
only if the regional economy grows rapidly. Thus, subnational governments tend to impose 
various administrative requirements on local firms’ operations in order to achieve a high 
growth rate. The political tournament results in local protectionism (Gu, Zhang, Vaz, & 
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Mukwereza, 2016; Young, 2000).  
Local protectionism hampers the free flow of products, labor and capital across regions, 
resulting in a relatively closed and less competitive subnational market (Rivera-Santos, Rufin, 
& Kolk, 2012). Meanwhile, local protectionism confines the outflow of local capital by 
attracting POEs to stay in the region (Bai et al., 2004). On the one hand, subnational 
governments can offer favored POEs key tangible resources, such as land and real estate, as 
well as intangible resources, namely localized knowledge, human resources or business 
opportunities (Li et al., 2003). They can also provide legitimacy for POEs in formal and 
informal ways, including granting licenses and permission (Wan & Hoskisson，2003). On the 
other hand, local governments can control the financial channels and restrict the foreign 
currency exchanges which are crucial for firm survival and international expansion (Peng, 2002; 
Wang et al., 2012). Thus, subnational governments can influence regional competition through 
imposing local protectionism, thereby affecting POEs’ decisions (Ioannou & Serafeim, 2012). 
In the context of local protectionism and the political tournament, POEs and subnational 
governments build up interdependent relationships based on mutual interests i.e. the ‘growth 
coalition’. However, subnational governments hold more power as they have more control over 
resources (Casciaro et al., 2005). 
It has been noted that subnational governments treat SOEs and POEs differently in many 
aspects, including firms’ OFDI (Buckley et al., 2018; Zhao & Lu, 2016). Private enterprises 
that survive and develop under the dominance of SOEs are discriminated against by 
governments in some regions (Bai et al., 2004; Meyer & Thein, 2014). Subnational 
governments often support SOEs’ OFDI by providing resources or preferential administrative 
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orders to obtain high scores in the political tournament (Palmer & Wiseman, 1999; Arregle et 
al., 2016). SOEs’ internationalization is regarded as an important political achievement by the 
central government (Cui et al., 2012), whereas POEs’ OFDI is usually regarded as capital 
outflow which may affect the local economy negatively (Li et al., 2003). Thus, POEs’ OFDI 
decisions are more likely to be constrained by local protectionism. 
 
Theoretical background 
The fast-growing literature on the internationalization of EE firms has highlighted the impact 
of the home-country institutional environment on this group of MNEs (Buckley, et al., 2018; 
Cuervo-Cazura, et al., 2018; Cui and Jiang, 2012; Gaur, Kumar, and Singh, 2014; Lu et al., 
2014; Luo, Xue, & Han, 2010; Luo & Tung, 2007; Wan and Hoskisson, 2003; Wang et al., 
2012). One stream of the literature has proposed that underdeveloped or incompatible 
institutions at home push firms to escape through OFDI (Barnard and Luiz, 2018; Huang et al., 
2016; Luo and Tung, 2017; Ma, Ding & Yuan, 2016; Shi et al., 2017; Witt & Lewin, 2007). 
For example, Stoian and Mohr (2015) assert that institutional and regulative voids in the home 
country, such as corruption and bureaucracy, promote OFDI by serving as a ‘pushing hand’ 
encouraging firms to avoid the competitive disadvantages rooted in the institutional 
environment. Some EMNEs escape home-country institutional voids by investing in tax havens 
in order to reduce the transparency of investments, leading at times to round-trip investments, 
aimed at benefiting from the incentives available to foreign investors in the home country 
(Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 2018). Direct state actions would also encourage large firms to adopt a 
more diversified strategy and a faster pace in internationalization (Finchelstein, 2017).  
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In addition, firms may use OFDI as a springboard to gain advanced technology, 
internationally recognized brands and valuable resources unavailable at home, and achieve 
desirable performance (Cui and Xu, 2019; Cui et al., 2017; Lu et al., 2011; Luo & Tung, 2007; 
2017; Xie, et al., 2019). A more recent paper by Gaur et al. (2018) further examines the 
complex home-country environments and highlights government supportiveness and industry 
unfavorableness as potential drivers of the OFDI activities of Chinese firms. However, the 
existing research has overlooked the existence of a ‘pulling hand’, which may inhibit firms 
from undertaking OFDI (Meyer & Nguyen, 2005). More specifically, local protectionism may 
prevent POEs escaping from the local region through OFDI.  
Resource dependence theory  
RDT suggests that organizations are embedded in the external environment and depend on 
powerful external actors (e.g. individuals, firms, groups, governments) for key resources, such 
as financial capital, raw materials and legitimacy (Oliver, 1991; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). 
Reciprocally, external actors may also depend on the focal organizations for resources, thus 
creating interdependent relationships (Blumentritt, 2003). Pfeffer and Salancik (1978: p. 40) 
defined interdependence as a phenomenon that exists whenever one actor does not entirely 
control all of the conditions necessary for the achievement of an action, or for obtaining the 
outcome desired from the action. As resources are often distributed unevenly, a power 
imbalance may exist between the focal organization and the external actors (Casciaro & 
Piskorski, 2005). If the external actors control more key resources, they have more power over 
the actions and decisions of the focal organization (Choudhury & Khanna, 2014).  
 10 
As a crucial resource holder, the government is a key external actor and can provide the 
focal organizations with monetary and/or physical resources, and information, as well as 
endorsing their social legitimacy (Choudhury & Khanna, 2014; Hillman et al., 2009). Thus, 
the government plays a vital role in affecting the extent to which firms gain access to the 
resources they need for survival and success in both developed countries and transition 
economies (Jia, 2014; Wang et al., 2012).  
Firms’ strategic responses to the subnational government  
RDT scholars recognize the role of external factors in affecting organizational behavior and, 
in response, managers can act to reduce environmental uncertainty and counterbalance 
dependence (Hillman et al., 2009). Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) proposed that firms could 
minimize dependence by reducing the power of others while attempting to increase their own 
power. One effective approach to altering the power imbalance would be to restructure the 
source of a firm’s resources in various ways (Xia et al., 2014). For example, organizations 
could seek alternative sources for their resources, or build up resource coalitions through 
strategic alliances and mergers, or vertical integration in the focal industry (Hillman et al., 
2009).  
Based on the logic of RDT, POEs need to develop proactive strategies to ensure access to 
external resources controlled by subnational governments. More specifically, CPA and 
corporate philanthropy can be adopted to manage the power imbalance between the 
government and POEs (Wang, Choi & Li, 2008). CPA is usually used to cope with less-than-
ideal political factors and seek support from the political environment so as to obtain access to 
external resources (Deng, Yan, & Essen, 2018). This strategy is achieved by gaining influence 
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over political rules and regulations, as well as striving for preferential treatment from 
governments (Hillman et al., 2004). In such cases, firms obey instructions from the government, 
and in turn they rely on governments for crucial resources. However, CPA can be a double-
edged sword which may strengthen the dependence and power imbalance, and therefore firms 
may lose their decision-making autonomy (Oliver, 1991; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  
Corporate philanthropy enables firms to enhance their reputation and establish close 
relationships with multiple stakeholders (Godfrey, 2005; Wang et al., 2008). Fiaschi, Giuliani, 
& Nieri (2017) propose that CSR helps emerging market firms to build legitimacy to overcome 
home-country liabilities in the context of international business. Adopting the philanthropy 
strategy, POEs can minimize their dependence on the subnational government and reduce the 
restrictions associated with local protectionism in the focal region (Wang, et al., 2008). 
Through engaging with other external stakeholders, firms may find alternative sources of 
resources and readdress the power imbalance with the government to gain more independence 
in decision making, including OFDI decisions (Xia et al., 2014). Treating local protectionism 
as a barrier to POEs’ internationalization, we propose that CPA and corporate philanthropy can 
alter the interdependency between POEs and the subnational government, and hence indirectly 
affect their OFDI decisions.  
Hypothesis development  
Local protectionism and POEs’ OFDI  
RDT proposes that a power imbalance in an interdependent relationship enables the 
dominant actor to affect the power-disadvantaged one, and its actions (Casciaro & Piskorski, 
2005; Choudhury et al., 2014). In a transition economy, especially in China, the government is 
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the most powerful actor (Young, 2000; Guar et al., 2018), and POEs have to take account of 
subtle pressure from governments when making strategic decisions (Cui & Xu, 2019). In 
addition, with the continuing decentralized political reforms in China, there are regional 
differences in the levels of provincial government control and protectionist policies (Li et al., 
2003; Poncet, 2003). Such differences mean that firms locating in different provinces may 
encounter disparate opportunities and constraints associated with local protectionism for 
several reasons.  
First, foreign exchange control can be used by subnational governments to impose 
investment restrictions on POEs’ OFDI decisions. Before 2001, POEs’ OFDI activities needed 
licenses authorized by the subnational governments, though this regulation was revoked by the 
central government after China joined the WTO. However, subnational governments still have 
the right to monitor outflow investment activities, including investment permission, destination, 
and transaction liquidity (Bai et al., 2004; Luo, Xue, & Han, 2010). Some subnational 
governments can prevent POEs’ OFDI by explicitly using the rules and regulations relating to 
foreign currency exchanges. For example, POEs are limited in the transfer of money to foreign 
countries and need to obtain permission from the subnational government. POEs must report 
outflow investments to the provincial Bureau of Foreign Exchange.  
Second, governments may use subtle ways to punish those POEs that seek to invest abroad. 
For instance, a local government may institute regular checks on a POE’s operations and 
impose fines for minor breaches of regulations, or impose certain administrative orders and 
inspection requirements. These implicit punishments may undermine a POE’s determination 
to expand internationally. Thus, POEs that originate from a region where local protectionism 
 13 
is dominant have to take the possible hostile reaction of the local government into consideration. 
This may deter them from undertaking OFDI. In fact, POEs are more likely to choose a 
product/business diversification strategy in the focal region rather than international 
diversification (Li et al., 2014). 
Third, under local protectionism, subnational governments provide local firms with 
favorable policies and key resources, such as industry entry permission and the factors of 
production, including land and raw materials, as well as some intangible resources, namely 
localized knowledge, human resources and business opportunities (Wang et al., 2016; Young, 
2000). It is common for provinces to develop industrial zones where local firms can obtain 
preferential treatment, subsidies for R&D activities, and help with recruitment. Firms are 
shielded from competition with those from other regions because local protectionism often 
takes the form of informal obstacles that prevent rivals from other regions entering the local 
market (Bai et al., 2004; Young, 2000). Local protectionism builds up a relatively closed 
regional business environment for local firms so that they can enjoy the benefits from such 
protection (Li et al., 2003; Bai et al., 2004). This implies that local firms operating in regions 
with a high degree of local protection will be less likely to develop the organizational capability 
needed for OFDI.  
Relatedly, to gain support and acquire crucial resources from the subnational government, 
POEs have to comply with local protection rules implemented by the local government, or face 
possible adverse consequences. They are obliged to show commitment to the local economy in 
exchange for local protection and favorable policies (Li et al., 2003; Bai et al., 2004). For 
instance, subnational governments may ask POEs to promise a specific amount of investment 
 14 
in exchange for a low-tax policy, or encourage firms to stay in the region by providing low-
priced and large-scale land resources (Tan & Meyer, 2010).  
Lastly, firms’ resources and capabilities originating from local protectionism can be difficult 
to transfer across a national boundary. If firms intend to explore the international market, the 
mutually dependent relationship, guanxi, and some other non-market capabilities embedded in 
the local region may lose their value in a host country where firms have to rely on market-
based capabilities to compete (Yamakawa et al., 2008). Moreover, firms which rely on non-
market capabilities are often less competitive in the international market, especially developed-
country markets. Hence, we propose:   
Hypothesis 1：Local protectionism has a negative association with the likelihood of OFDI by 
POEs in a transition economy. 
The moderating role of corporate philanthropy  
Corporate philanthropy involves the donation of money or gifts to charitable organizations, 
which connects organizations with the stakeholders more closely (Godfrey, 2005; Mellahi et 
al., 2016; Wang et al., 2008). It can improve the corporate image and enhance the value of a 
firm’s moral capital (Godfrey, 2005; Porter & Kramer, 2002). It can also help to mitigate the 
risks of reputational losses and secure critical resources, hence providing insurance-like 
protection (Williams & Barrett, 2000). In addition, corporate philanthropy enables the focal 
firm to interact more with the external environment and stakeholders (Wang et al., 2008; 
Hillman et al., 2009), thus alleviating the focal firm’s dependence on the regional government 
and reducing the impact of local protectionism in several ways.  
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First, philanthropy helps firms to lessen their resource dependence on the regional 
government by intensifying their relationship with direct stakeholders, including investors, 
suppliers and customers (Margolis et al., 2007; Wang & Qian, 2011). McKinsey (2013) noted 
that stakeholders are increasingly holding firms responsible for the CSR activities of their 
global business partners. By engaging in philanthropy, firms are more likely to gain positive 
responses from primary stakeholders. A firm’s public image as a responsible company could 
extend to other aspects of business, such as high standards of product quality and customer 
services (Adams & Hardwick, 2010). This should, in turn, help a firm gain customer support. 
Moreover, firms may receive more favorable evaluations from investors, benefit from 
increased demand, and attract suppliers (Marano et al., 2016; Marquis & Qian, 2014).  
POEs with a philanthropic reputation may be able to obtain their much needed resources 
from other external stakeholders apart from the regional government (Haley, 1991; Zheng, Luo 
& Maksimov, 2015). The more philanthropic activities a firm undertakes, the more easily it 
could be identified by stakeholders, and the more resource exchanges could occur with the 
stakeholders (Hillman, 2009). In particular, MNEs from developed countries are more willing 
to cooperate with socially responsible enterprises (Marano et al., 2016), therefore widening the 
range of available resources, including international supply chains, international experiences 
and international networks. By diversifying the source of the resources they need, POEs 
become less dependent on the local government for vital resources, which enables them to have 
more autonomy when making OFDI decisions. For example, we interviewed the CEO and 
other senior managers of a well-known beverage company in Zhejiang Province. The company 
created a charity foundation with 10 million yuan in 2009 and built a responsible image in the 
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eyes of various stakeholders, including DuPont. When the company faced some difficulties in 
developing new material for a new product, it asked DuPont for help in 2010. The CEO stated 
that the good reputation of the company facilitated strategic cooperation with DuPont, thus 
stabilizing the supply of the new material. As a well-established MNE, DuPont brought 
international management experience to the company, especially their global supply-chain 
management knowledge, which helped the company seek and integrate resources from all over 
the world, and build a manufacturing base abroad.  
In addition to direct stakeholders, governments may also appreciate firms’ philanthropic 
efforts because philanthropy can assist regional governments in solving some societal problems, 
and so reduce the governmental burden (Wang & Qian, 2011; Zhou, 2004). Therefore, regional 
governments tend to encourage such activities and would be more cautious about taking actions 
to ‘punish’ POEs participating in philanthropic activities when they seek to undertake OFDI 
(Qian, Gao, & Tsang, 2015).  
We also interviewed an official from a provincial government to gain further insights on 
this issue. The interviewee stated that there are some yearly philanthropic activities organized 
by the provincial government, such as the Hope Project. The firms that make a donation are 
on a list of donors and get praised at the end of year by the local government. The firms on the 
list are more likely to obtain some preferential treatment, and are able to gain access to high-
level officials in the provincial government if they need assistance and protection. Moreover, 
the interviewee pointed out that the government holds an annual charity party or press 
conference to release the charitable performance of the focal firms to the public. This shows 
that philanthropic activities can enhance firms’ visibility and reputation. Their daily operations 
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can draw the attention of the public. If those firms suffer from informal harassment, the 
reputation of the local government could be damaged. Therefore, subnational governments 
usually choose not to intervene with such firms, but to provide assistance instead. This suggests 
that firms involved in philanthropic activities may possess more management discretion with 
regard to OFDI decisions than those without such activities. Taken together, we propose that: 
H2：The negative relationship between local protectionism and the likelihood of OFDI will be 
less pronounced for POEs demonstrating corporate philanthropy. 
The moderating role of CPA 
Apart from engaging in corporate philanthropy, POEs can pursue an adaption strategy to 
accommodate local protectionism and reduce environmental uncertainty (Hillman et al., 2009). 
Using an adaption strategy implies that firms build up political connections with subnational 
governments (Marquis & Qian, 2014). POEs, as a relatively new organizational form in China, 
inherently lack legitimacy and political connections (Li & Zhang, 2007). Hence, they have an 
incentive to engage in CPA through which they create a favorable environment and hence can 
cope better with latent political risks (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Hillman et al., 2005). While 
engaging in CPA can enable POEs to gain market entry permits, critical resources and 
legitimacy, which are important for their survival and success in the focal region, it also can 
strengthen the POEs’ dependency on local protection and reduce their incentive to venture 
abroad for three main reasons.  
First, CPA enables a POE to strengthen its relationship with the local government and help 
the firm to receive preferential treatment and favorable support (Hillman et al., 1999; Sun et 
al., 2012). On the basis of local protectionism, the subnational government often sends signals 
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and information to the local firms with whom the government has a close relationship, 
including the interpretation of new regulations and changes in the strategic priority of 
government policies. Such signals may protect the firms from competition with rivals from 
other regions and create new business opportunities (Zhang et al., 2016). In exchange, POEs 
need to support the subnational government in achieving its strategic priority (Jia, 2014). In 
particular, POEs are obliged to deliver politically valuable benefits to the subnational 
government, such as sustained economic growth and increased employment. This reciprocal 
relationship may bind the POEs to operate locally as a political obligation (Zhang et al., 2016).  
From the viewpoint of subnational officials, POEs can contribute to economic growth and 
boost local employment; these are key factors in the political career of officials (Young, 2000). 
Therefore, government officials have an incentive to encourage POEs to stay in the focal region 
by providing valuable resources and policy support (Bai et al., 2004; Tan, Li, & Xia, 2007). 
This suggests that when a POE relies on the resources associated with local protectionism, and 
is locked into a mutually beneficial relationship with a subnational government, it could face 
the risk of losing some decision-making autonomy (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Jia, 2014). Even 
strong POEs may be unable to escape due to political obligations to deliver the strategic targets 
of the subnational government in exchange for resources and preferential treatment.  
One important motivation for POEs’ OFDI is to escape an unfavorable institutional 
environment at home and seek competitive advantages abroad (Witt & Lewin, 2007; Sun et al., 
2014). However, through CPA, POEs can cultivate a relatively favorable environment at home 
which may reduce their desire for OFDI, and hence they may choose to concentrate on 
product/business diversification strategies in the focal region instead (Gaur & Delios, 2015).  
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Second, CPA may impede the development of market capabilities and limit the international 
experience which is a driving force for OFDI. If a firm relies on cultivating political 
connections with the regional government, it may neglect developing necessary market 
capabilities (Peltzman, 1976; Sun, Mellahi, & Thun, 2010). From RDT, the more attention a 
firm pays to the government, the less the firm depends on other stakeholders in the industry or 
the market, such as suppliers and partners (Hillman et al., 2009). When managers heavily rely 
on political connections, they tend to remain with a domestic focus. There is a trade-off 
between investing in CPA and market-based capability, and deep political embeddedness may 
hinder the development of a market-based capability. Thus, rent-seeking CAP may weaken 
firms’ ability to expand internationally (Li, Zhou, & Shao, 2009).   
The arguments above are also reflected in our interview with a senior manager of a famous 
diversified group. The company has been a flourishing clothing company since the early 1990s, 
and it hoped to build factories in other Southeastern Asian countries in 2010. Over the years, 
the company built up a robust relationship with the local government by providing a vast 
amount of taxation and supporting local officials through close political connections. The CEO 
was a member of National People’s Congress. However, the regional government sought to 
discourage the internationalization plan of the company when they became aware of it at an 
early stage and, in this case, the provincial government provided land for developing real estate. 
In the end, the company gave up their international plans and, with continuing support from 
the regional government, it became a diversified business group in the focal region with 
business interests in tailoring, real estate and financial investment.  
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In summary, CPA may reinforce the constraints of local protectionism on a POE’s OFDI 
decisions, as POEs with CAP are more inclined to achieve the subnational government’s 
strategic priority by staying in the focal region. In addition, the advantage derived from CPA 
tends to be localized which implies that POEs with CPA have less desire to escape from the 
focal region. Our discussion leads to the following hypothesis:   
H3：The negative relationship between local protectionism and the likelihood of OFDI will be 
more pronounced for POEs with CPA. 
Methodology 
Sampling and data collection 
Our sample was based on the official survey of Chinese POEs in 2012, which was led by the 
Privately Owned Enterprises Research Project Team (POERPT). Firstly, the team picked a 
multi-stage stratified random sample of POEs from all of the 34 provinces in China. Then, the 
data were collected from direct structured interviews with the major founder of each POE in 
the sample. The survey covered 4,033 firms from 19 industries, based on the Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) categories. After eliminating missing data and invalid 
observations, the final sample consisted of 3,024 firms across 19 industries and 31 provincial-
level regions. They are relatively young firms, with an average of 9 years in business. 
According to the survey, over 90% of the sample firms operate in and regard the local region 
as their main market. Their geographical concentration in the focal region makes their OFDI 
decisions more likely to be affected by the focal subnational government. The survey provided 
information about the sample firms’ characteristics, OFDI decisions, and their founders’ 
backgrounds, as well as political connections. In addition, we used regional-level data on 
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market fragmentation among 30 provinces (except Tibet) in 2011, extracted from the China 
Statistical Yearbook, to measure the level of local protectionism. We collected the price index 
of 9 types of retailing goods from 2009 to 2011 to control for random fluctuation and combined 
the data at firm-level and region-level to test whether heterogeneity in local protectionism 
across regions in China influences the OFDI decisions of POEs. 
Dependent variables 
The dependent variable is a dummy variable which measures whether the sample firms decided 
to invest abroad or not. The OFDI decision is coded 1 for the firms with OFDI activities in 
2011, and zero otherwise. As discussed above, the OFDI decision is affected by the 
characteristics of firms as well as the provincial region where firms originated.  
Explanatory variables 
At the subnational level, we measured local protectionism by the degree of market 
fragmentation in a region, based on a commonly used calculation formula, ‘Law of One Price’ 
(Wang, 2016). This measurement discards the errors and systematic residuals caused by 
industry-level characteristics, commodity price, and local resources, which has been used to 
analyze regional market barriers in previous studies (Parsley & Wei, 1996, 2001). We used the 
natural logarithm of index of market fragmentation in our estimations.  
At the firm level, there are two moderating variables: corporate philanthropy and CPA 
strategy. Corporate Philanthropy is measured by the normalized proportion of philanthropic 
donations before OFDI activities to industry average in 2011. CPA is a dummy variable: if a 
firm is a member of the subnational Federation of Industry and Commerce (FIC), CPA equals 
1 and zero otherwise. As the FIC is a quasi-official organization which serves as a bridge 
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between the subnational government and POEs, membership of provincial FIC enables POEs 
to participate in policy making, gain direct access to government officials and lobby on behalf 
of private sectors to protect POEs’ business interests. Thus, the FIC plays an essential role in 
changing resource interdependency with subnational governments through strengthening the 
interactions and exchanging information about government policies and the market among its 
members (Deng & Kennedy, 2010; Jia, 2014). 
Control variables 
We controlled for some firm characteristics, industry and regional factors which might affect 
POEs’ OFDI strategy. We measured Firm age as the length of time since a firm was founded, 
and Firm size using the natural logarithm of the total number of employees. As firm owners 
exert essential influence on the firm’s international decisions, and internationalization is 
regarded as a risk-taking activity, we controlled for the firm owners’ Gender which equals 1 if 
the owner is male (Saeed & Sameer, 2017). We also measured the firm’s technology capacity 
by R&D intensity which is the proportion of R&D expenditure in total sales, as technology 
capability can foster OFDI (Tseng, Tansuhaj, Hallagan, & McCullough, 2007). By engaging in 
CSR, firms are able to manage stakeholder participation and improve their reputation in a 
systematic and structured way, therefore we controlled for CSR reporting (Marquis, Yin, 
&Yang, 2017). We also controlled for Temporary employees which is the ratio of temporary 
employees to total employees, because temporary employment mitigates the increasing 
pressures for lowering costs and risks in the home market (Brewster et al. 1997; Glaister et al., 
2014). We controlled for Foreign ownership which is the ratio of foreign investment to total 
capital, because foreign investors could be an important source of knowledge concerning 
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international markets (Lu et al., 2014). In our dataset, 87% of the sample firms are fully 
privately owned, and the rest involved in some foreign investment but still controlled by private 
owners.     
Industry is an essential factor which may affect POEs’ OFDI decision, and thus we controlled 
for industry specific effects by including the dummy variables Industry-Agri and Industry-
Manu, which classify industries into agriculture, manufacturing and services. Some firms have 
been involved in various industries. Therefore, we also controlled for Industry diversity to 
capture the impact of the firms’ diversification strategy.  
At the subnational level, we controlled for GDP growth, which is the increase in value of all 
final goods and services produced within China in 2011 compared to the previous year in terms 
of measuring the subnational economic development. The data were collected from the annual 
national statistical reports of the National Bureau of Statistics. We also controlled for the 
‘Development of social intermediaries’, which were collected from the Index of marketization 
(Fan, 2007). The measure of the development of social intermediaries captures the impact of 
some aspects of the society apart from economic and political factors.  
Estimation methods  
The dependent variable is a dummy variable which consists of zero or one, but zero occurs 
more frequently than value one in our sample. Hence, we adopted rare-event logistic 
regressions to test our empirical model, which helps to clarify the largely overlooked 
consequences of rare-event data in the international context and avoids rare-event bias and 
standard error inconsistency when compared with general logit regression (King & Zeng, 2001). 
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In order to reduce the potential problem of multicollinearity, the independent variable and 
moderating variables were mean-centered (Aiken & West, 1994). 
Results 
Descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix are shown in Table 1. As the mean value of the 
dependent variable is close to zero, this confirms that our choice of rare-event logit regression 
is appropriate. We checked for multicollinearity among the explanatory variables by a variance 
inflation matrix analysis. As the variance inflation factor indices are below 1.8, this indicates 
that multicollinearity is not a major concern in our model (Neter, Wasserman, & Kutner, 1990). 
------------------------------------------- 
Insert Tables 1 & 2 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
Table 2 represents the results of multi-level rare-event logit regression. We report five 
models, respectively. Model 1 includes the control variables only. In Model 2, we added the 
independent variable, the index of local protectionism. The results support Hypothesis 1 which 
assumes local protectionism has a significantly negative association with POEs’ OFDI 
decisions. In Model 3, we entered the variable of corporate philanthropy, which moderates the 
relationship between OFDI decisions and local protectionism (p<0.1), offering support for 
Hypothesis 2. In Model 4 CPA negatively moderates the relationship between OFDI decisions 
and the level of local protectionism (p<0.1), thus supporting Hypothesis 3. In Model 5 (the full 
model), which contains all the variables, an increase in the pseudo R2 has been observed. The 
results in the full model provide more robust support for all three hypotheses.  
Figures 1 and 2 visualize how corporate philanthropy and CPA interact with POEs’ OFDI 
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decisions and local protectionism. As shown in Figure 1, the POEs with more corporate 
philanthropy activities are more likely to make OFDI decisions, and the likelihood of 
undertaking OFDI becomes higher when the local protectionism is more pronounced. As the 
level of local protectionism increases, the slope becomes more positive, which means corporate 
philanthropy mitigates the negative relationship between local protectionism and the OFDI 
decision in a subnational region. Similarly, Figure 2 illustrates that the POEs with CPA are less 
likely to adopt an OFDI strategy, particularly in subnational regions with a higher level of local 
protectionism, suggesting that the negative relationship between local protectionism and OFDI 
becomes stronger for the POEs engaging in CPA.  
------------------------------------------- 




Drawing on resource dependency theory, we examine the extent to which local protectionism 
affects POEs’ OFDI decisions, and POEs’ strategic actions to respond to the subnational 
government. The findings show that POEs’ pursuit of OFDI is negatively associated with the 
degree of local protectionism in a subnational region, indicating that local protection 
instrumented by the subnational government in the home country impedes POEs’ OFDI 
decisions. The findings reveal a neglected barrier, local protectionism, encountered by these 
firms.     
 In addition, we pay special attention to POEs’ strategic responses to local protectionism, 
and find the extent to which the effect of local protectionism on POEs’ OFDI decisions is 
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contingent on POEs’ non-market strategies. More specifically, POEs which adopt a corporate 
philanthropy strategy can lessen their resource dependency on the local government and are 
more likely to overcome the constraints of local protectionism on their OFDI decisions. One 
possible reason for this is that firms could build interdependent relationships with other 
stakeholders in the local market to broaden their source of key resources by engaging in 
corporate philanthropy. In doing so, POEs can exercise more discretion in decision making and 
alleviate government control through local protectionism, thus reducing the negative impact of 
local protectionism on their OFDI decisions. In contrast, POEs with a CPA strategy are less 
likely to engage in OFDI activity. This is because a CPA strategy tends to strengthen the 
interdependent relationship with subnational governments. POEs with CPA are obliged to stay 
in the focal region in order to obtain crucial resources and support from the subnational 
government. Such a reciprocal relationship constrains POEs’ management discretion on 
decision making. As a result, CPA reinforces the negative impact of local protectionism on 
OFDI, and POEs adopting a CPA strategy are less likely to undertake escape OFDI. Thus, 
escape OFDI is not a universal response to the unfavorable or incompatible institutional 
environment. If firms can take strategic action to alter their relationship with the government 
and change the adverse institutional environment in their favor, they do not have to look outside 
the home country.   
Contributions 
Our study complements existing research on the OFDI originating from transition economy 
firms in several distinctive ways. First, this research contributes to the literature on the 
institutional escaping lens by revealing the barriers to escaping through OFDI (Witt & Lewin, 
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2007; Yamakawa et al., 2008). Existing studies based on the institutional escape lens regard 
OFDI activities as a strategic response to an unfavorable or incompatible institutional 
environment, including institutional instability, legal immaturity, and corruption (Child & 
Marinova, 2014; Luo & Tung, 2007). However, the existing research overlooks the fact that in 
a transition economy, the subnational government can impose restrictions on firms’ 
international strategies (Huang et al., 2016). Our study reveals the existence of the ‘pulling 
hand’ of the subnational government, which restrains POEs from OFDI by implementing local 
protection policies. Thus, the findings extend the escape view by shedding light on the tension 
between the subnational governments and POEs’ OFDI decisions, and support the recent 
argument that a poor institutional environment at home hampers POEs’ outward 
internationalization (Young et al., 2014; Sun et al., 2014). From resource dependency logic, the 
dominant position of subnational governments implies that governments have the power to 
control POEs’ activities through informal and implicit actions, thus inhibiting POEs’ OFDI 
activities. Therefore, our study reveals the dark side of government intervention which makes 
escape OFDI difficult.  
Second, our study enriches the existing literature by capturing the special characteristics of 
transition economies in which local protectionism is prevalent. Examining local protectionism 
allows us to analyse a specific institutional constraint that is directly observable across regions 
in China. Doing so enables us to gain a richer picture of how subnational government 
intervention directly affects POEs’ OFDI decisions. By capturing the impact of local 
protectionism, our study moves beyond the focus on the effect exerted by the general 
institutional environment prevalent in the extant literature (Ma et al., 2013; Monaghan, 
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Gunnigle, & Lavelle, 2014).  
Moreover, much research has focused on how the relationship between government and 
SOEs affects OFDI decisions (Meyer et al., 2005; Cui et al., 2012; Huang et al., 2016) because 
of the inherent political connections between the two actors. However, we have an incomplete 
understanding of the political relationship between POEs and subnational governments in a 
transition economy which are beyond ownership ties. We identify the dominant role of the 
subnational government in the institutional environment and pay particular attention to local 
protectionism when analyzing POEs’ OFDI decisions in such an environment. A more precise 
focus on local protectionism is vital as it provides an interconnected lens which enables us to 
unpack the complex relationship between POEs and subnational governments to reveal the 
barriers to escape OFDI by transition economy firms. 
Existing studies tend to treat the institutional environment as a homogenous external factor 
which affects firms in the same way (North, 1990; Shi et al., 2017). In contrast, in the logic of 
local protectionism, firms with different traits and resources get distinct treatment from 
subnational governments. Thus, examining the impact of local protectionism helps advance 
our knowledge of the mechanisms through which the government affects POEs’ OFDI 
decisions. Extensive research has focused on government support for OFDI (Arregle, Miller, 
Hitt, & Beamish, 2016; Gaur et al., 2018; Lu et al., 2014; Wan & Hoskisson, 2003). Our study 
reveals a unique way in which subnational governments manage regional economies and 
intervene in POEs’ OFDI activity, thus hampering escape OFDI. 
Third, this research contributes to our understanding of the strategic actions taken by POEs 
to alter the level of interdependence and to escape through OFDI. The extant research reveals 
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some market factors that can alter the pressure from governments, such as market competition, 
location strategy and entry modes (Huang et al., 2016; Guar et al., 2017; Meyer et al., 2005; 
Sun et al., 2014), but little is known about nonmarket behaviors which POEs could adopt to 
cope with the government-business relationship in the context of a transition economy. We find 
that corporate philanthropy and CPA have differing impacts on the relationship between POEs’ 
internationalization decisions and the subnational governments from the RDT logic. Our study, 
thus, complements the existing research on market strategy and broadens the scope in which 
firms interact with subnational governments. We move beyond market strategy by reflecting 
the unique characteristics of transition economies in which government intervention is 
prevalent, and where firms need to employ multiple strategies to counterbalance their 
dependence on subnational governments in order to pursue a long-term strategy, such as OFDI 
activities.  
Managerial implications  
Our study has implications for POEs’ managers in transition economies who are planning to 
expand their business into the international market. Our findings illustrate that firms should 
evaluate both the subnational political environment and the interdependent relationship with 
the subnational government when considering OFDI activities. If local protectionism in the 
region is prevalent, firms should be cautious about close links to government as this could lead 
to a loss of independence. Alternatively, firms could adopt a corporate philanthropy strategy to 
manage their dependence on the government by building up relationships with other 
stakeholders. Meanwhile, for those firms which are located in relatively market-oriented 
regions, managers cannot ignore the function of the subnational government as this could affect 
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their access to resources (Hillman et al., 2009).  
Our study has some implications for subnational governments. First, local protectionism has 
a negative impact on OFDI decisions. If all levels of government hope to build up a fully 
functioning market economy in China, they should reduce interference with local business 
activities and leave more room for POEs. Second, if the goal of government officials is to 
achieve success in politics, then building up a relatively closed market may not be the best way. 
Instead, they should devise significant policies to accelerate the development of the local 
economy, such as by attracting more competitive firms to the region and encouraging firms to 
internationalize and acquire additional skills in order to achieve improved market capabilities. 
For the central government, in order to build an environment where POEs can engage in OFDI, 
local protectionism at the subnational level should be limited. 
Limitations and future research  
Our study has some limitations which represent interesting avenues for future research. First, 
we used cross-section data to test our model, which limited our sample size. Although we 
conducted several interviews to further strengthen our hypotheses, future studies could use a 
longitudinal dataset to examine the impact of local protectionism on OFDI decisions. Second, 
we used local protectionism as a proxy for the control mechanism of subnational governments. 
Future research could use other measurements to capture the relationship between firms and 
subnational governments.   
Third, our measure of corporate philanthropy did not distinguish whether philanthropic 
activities take place within the focal region or across regions due to the data constraint. Future 
research could go a step further to examine whether the geographic scope of corporate 
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philanthropy alters the interdependence between subnational governments and POEs. 
Relatedly, we only measured one dimension of CPA strategy in terms of POEs’ political 
connection. Such a measure may not fully capture the moderating effect of POEs’ CPA strategy 
on the relationship between local protectionism and POEs’ OFDI decisions. Future studies 
could adopt more fine-grained measurements for POEs’ CPA strategy to more fully reveal the 
complex interplay between local protectionism, CPA and POEs’ OFDI decisions. Finally, our 
sample firms are mainly located in the focal region. Future research could explore whether 




This study advances our understanding of POEs’ OFDI decisions by considering the impact of 
the subnational political environment. By analyzing a sample of Chinese POEs, we found that 
local protectionism in the subnational regions in the home country can impede their OFDI 
decisions. Our findings suggest that enterprises in transition economies should pay more 
attention to the subnational political environment. Our study also identifies two types of 
nonmarket strategies and sheds light on how POEs deal with their dependency on the 
subnational government. Corporate philanthropy and CPA strategies can alter the 
interdependence between the subnational government and focal firms, thus moderating the 
relationship between local protectionism and POEs’ OFDI decisions. Only by overcoming the 
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics and correlations  
 M S.D 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
OFDI Decision 
 
0.023 0.150                 
Local Protectionism -7.974 0.692 -0.005 
*** 
               




              




             






            








           










          












         










        
R&D intensity 0.088 1.941 0.023 -0.006 0.003 0.016 0.000 -0.036 
** 
0.034 ** -0.007 0.065 
*** 
       
CSR Reporting 1.949 0.220 -0.071 
*** 






-0.030 * -0.025 0.003 -0.039 
** 
      






0.027 0.024 -0.002 -0.061 
*** 
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Table 2 Relogit results: the impact of local protectionism on POE’s outward foreign direct investment decision 
 whetherinter whetherinter whetherinter whetherinter whetherinter 
Firm age 0.033 0.029 0.033 0.026 0.031 
 [0.026] [0.026] [0.026] [0.027] [0.026] 
Firm size 0.264*** 0.255*** 0.243*** 0.219** 0.214** 
 [0.091] [0.094] [0.092] [0.099] [0.098] 
Industry-manu 0.262 0.195 0.211 0.239 0.242 
 [0.305] [0.306] [0.312] [0.307] [0.313] 
Industry-agri 0.824* 0.784* 0.856* 0.787* 0.862* 
 [0.436] [0.443] [0.449] [0.441] [0.446] 
R&D intensity 0.736* 0.786** 0.549 0.734* 0.496 
 [0.396] [0.372] [0.388] [0.377] [0.399] 
Exporting  1.774*** 1.692*** 1.776*** 1.700*** 1.778*** 
 [0.351] [0.350] [0.349] [0.354] [0.352] 
CSR reporting -1.064*** -1.093*** -1.026*** -1.104*** -1.021*** 
 [0.363] [0.357] [0.365] [0.349] [0.358] 
Temporary employees 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Foreign Ownership -0.317 -0.296* -0.248 -0.287 -0.227 
 [0.194] [0.182] [0.183] [0.182] [0.182] 
Owner gender 0.241 0.303 0.279 0.344 0.317 
 [0.376] [0.373] [0.378] [0.369] [0.373] 
Industry diversity 0.474*** 0.496*** 0.474*** 0.502*** 0.476*** 
 [0.168] [0.175] [0.175] [0.179] [0.178] 
Development of -0.039 0.115* 0.112* 0.123* 0.119* 
social intermediaries [0.041] [0.064] [0.064] [0.063] [0.064] 
GDP increase -0.195** -0.207** -0.187* -0.212** -0.190** 
 [0.085] [0.097] [0.097] [0.093] [0.093] 
Local  -1.186*** -1.107*** -0.827** -0.642** 
Protectionism  [0.313] [0.311] [0.346] [0.367] 
Local ProtectionismX   2.484**  2.859* 
Philanthropy   [1.196]  [1.474] 
Philanthropy   4.749***  5.034*** 
   [0.932]  [1.104] 
Local ProtectionismX    -0.513* -0.563** 
CPA    [0.274] [0.296] 
CPA    -0.275 -0.245 
    [0.172] [0.171] 
χ2 55.84*** 70.65*** 76.43*** 76.48*** 77.29*** 
Pseudo R2 0.092 0.114 0.123 0.124 0.131 
N 3024 3024 3024 3024 3024 
 
Standard errors in brackets 




Figure 1 The moderation effect of corporate philanthropy on the relationship between the degree of 




Figure 2 The moderation effect of CPA on the relationship between the degree of local protectionism 
and firms’ OFDI decisions 
 
 
